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# Unlocking Homeownership in the GCC: The Case for a Registered Ownership Platform

The financial principle exists. The institutional architecture does not. That gap — not affordability, not appetite, not policy intent — is the real housing problem facing the GCC.

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# Executive Summary: The Argument in Brief

Saudi Arabia has succeeded in expanding homeownership. The homeownership rate rose from 47 percent in 2016 to **65.4 percent by end-2024**, surpassing the Vision 2030 target a full year early. Outstanding real estate loans exceeded **SAR 951 billion** by early 2025. By any measure, the programme has worked.

But the harder question is what happens next.

The households reached so far have largely been those at the lower end of the income spectrum — supported by direct subsidy, concessional financing through the Real Estate Development Fund, and the Sakani programme. The next cohort is structurally different: middle-income professionals earning too much to qualify for deep subsidy, too little to absorb full upfront ownership costs.

In Riyadh, the average four-bedroom villa now costs **SAR 2.8 million** against a budget ceiling of **SAR 1.5 million** for roughly two-thirds of buyers. Housing rent inflation reached **7.6 percent** in mid-2025.

The Kingdom's next homeownership target — **70 percent by 2030** — will require a model that can reach households subsidies alone cannot serve.

## The Core Argument

The financial mechanism exists. The institutional architecture does not. That gap — not affordability, not appetite — is the real housing problem.

This paper argues that **Shared Ownership** — structured through the Islamic finance principle of **Diminishing Musharaka** and delivered through a purpose-built **Registered Ownership Platform (ROP)** — is the most credible path to sustainable, scalable homeownership for the GCC's unsubsidised middle class.

The model is not theoretical. The financial principles are well established. The institutional candidates already exist. The investor demand is demonstrably present. What is missing is the institutional architecture to turn a financing principle into a national ownership strategy.

# Section 1: The Structural Problem — Entry, Not Aspiration

The GCC housing challenge is frequently described as an affordability problem. This framing is partially correct but strategically misleading. The issue is not that households cannot afford monthly payments — it is that they cannot afford the entry point.

A Knight Frank survey published in early 2025 found that **72 percent** of Saudis and expatriates aspire to own homes. The aspiration is not in question. What is in question is whether the system is designed to convert that aspiration into ownership at scale — without permanent subsidy dependence.

Three structural barriers define the problem:

### Entry Cost

Rising land values and construction cost inflation have pushed required deposits beyond the reach of early-career professionals, even where monthly mortgage servicing would be entirely manageable. The barrier is the accumulation phase that precedes the mortgage.

### Title Complexity

A fragmented land registry means the majority of plots still lack digital title, extending due-diligence cycles and constraining the pace at which new supply can reach the market.

### Subsidy Ceiling

Subsidy programmes — while effective for lower-income households — are capital-intensive, increasingly strained, and structurally misaligned with the middle-income cohort now forming the leading edge of demand.

# The Numbers That Define the Gap

**SAR 2.8M**

Avg. 4-bed villa price in Riyadh

**SAR 1.5M**

Budget ceiling for ~2/3 of buyers

**7.6%**

Housing rent inflation, mid-2025

**SAR 951B+**

Outstanding real estate loans, 2025

**65.4%**

Homeownership rate, end-2024

**70%**

Vision 2030 target by 2030

### A Genuine Achievement

Vision 2030's housing programme has delivered. The homeownership rate rose 18 percentage points in under a decade — a remarkable institutional accomplishment driven by direct subsidy, REDF financing, and the Sakani programme.

### A Structural Warning

The easy gains are behind us. Reaching 70 percent from 65.4 percent requires reaching a fundamentally different cohort through a fundamentally different model. The next five percentage points will not come from the same instruments that delivered the first eighteen.

# Section 2: Shared Ownership — A Capital Structure, Not a Discount

Shared Ownership is frequently misunderstood as a subsidised or discounted route into homeownership. This framing does it a disservice and obscures why it is strategically important. **Shared Ownership is a capital structure.** It sits strategically between renting and full ownership. A household purchases a portion of a property — typically between 25 and 50 percent — and pays an occupancy charge on the remaining share retained by a provider. Over time, through a process known as *staircasing*, the household progressively increases its ownership stake until full ownership is achieved.

| Factor | Traditional Mortgage | Shared Ownership (ROP) |
|---|---|---|
| Deposit required | SAR 300,000 (20% of SAR 1.5M) | SAR 120,000 (40% share model) |
| Equity building | Begins at full purchase | Begins immediately on entry |
| Household leverage | High — full purchase financed | Lower — partial share financed |
| Developer capital recovery | Full sale, but slower absorption | Faster — institutional take-out |
| Government role | Ongoing subsidy provider | Strategic enabler, not funder |
| Investor exposure | Transactional, no long-term hold | Long-duration income + appreciation |
| Default flexibility | Binary — pay or foreclose | Multiple restructuring options |

> Shared Ownership is not a housing discount. It is a better capital structure — for households, developers, investors, and government simultaneously.

# Section 3: Diminishing Musharaka — The GCC Already Has the Principle

One of the most important — and underappreciated — aspects of Shared Ownership for the GCC context is that the financial logic is not new. It already exists within Islamic finance, under the widely recognised structure of **Diminishing Musharaka**.

## How Diminishing Musharaka Works

A financial institution and a homeowner jointly acquire a property. The occupier makes two payments: a rental payment on the institution′s retained share, and a progressive equity purchase that reduces the institution′s stake over time until full ownership is transferred. The diminishing partnership gives the structure its name.

The conceptual parallel with Shared Ownership is direct. Both involve co-ownership. Both involve occupancy charges on the retained share. Both involve progressive equity transfer toward full ownership. The difference is not the financial principle — it is the institutional architecture surrounding it.

## Why the Equivalence Matters

Positioning Shared Ownership as compatible with Diminishing Musharaka removes the most significant barrier to adoption in the GCC: **cultural legitimacy**.

The model is not a foreign concept being imported. It is an institutional extension of principles the region already understands and already applies. The pathway to adoption does not require cultural or scholarly persuasion from scratch. It requires institutional design — building the platform around a principle the market already accepts.

In practice, the primary structuring consideration involves moving from a bilateral arrangement to a tripartite platform structure — raising specific Sharia structuring questions that are real and must be addressed directly.

# The Specific Sharia Structuring Questions

These are not objections to the model. They are the precise design questions that a Sharia advisory board — convened as part of the pilot structure — would be constituted to resolve.

1

### Co-ownership Character of the Platform

In standard Diminishing Musharaka, the co-owner is a bank acting in a financing capacity. In the ROP model, retained equity is held by a purpose-built platform entity. Scholars will need to confirm that the platform's ownership character remains consistent with Musharaka principles of genuine co-ownership and shared risk participation.

2

### Ijara at Portfolio Scale

The Ijara occupancy charge in a bilateral Diminishing Musharaka is levied by a bank on a single household. Scaling this to a platform structure — where a single entity levies charges across hundreds of households simultaneously with pre-agreed escalation mechanics — requires scholarly guidance on whether standardised Ijara contracts retain their bilateral validity at portfolio scale.

3

### Valuation Mechanics and Riba Avoidance

Staircasing requires periodic independent valuation of the retained equity share at each tranche purchase. The methodology — particularly in appreciating markets — must be structured to avoid any outcome resembling Riba through systematic overpricing of the platform's retained share. Pre-agreed valuation formulas with independent verification are the likely solution, but require explicit scholarly endorsement.

4

### Resale Protections and Household Property Rights

Standard Diminishing Musharaka does not typically include resale restrictions. A functional ROP requires resale controls to prevent windfall gains and protect long-term ownership inventory. Structuring these controls consistently with household property rights under Islamic law requires Fatwa-level clarity.

Islamic finance assets globally crossed **$3.88 trillion** by end-2024. The intellectual infrastructure for resolving complex Sharia structuring questions at institutional scale is well developed. The proposed pilot structure incorporates an independent Sharia supervisory board from inception — not as a compliance afterthought, but as a governance pillar.

# Section 4: The Institutional Gap — Why It Has Not Happened

If the financial principle exists, the institutional candidates are present, and the demand is clear — why has no ownership platform emerged? Three structural frictions explain the gap. A fourth deserves naming separately.

### 1. Developer Incentive Structure

Saudi Arabia′s residential market is dominated by a build-to-sell model, accounting for nearly half of gross market value. Developers depend on full off-plan sales to recycle capital. Retaining a partial equity stake ties up working capital for years and introduces asset management obligations most developers are neither structured nor incentivised to absorb.

### 2. Regulatory Absence

No regulatory category currently exists in Saudi Arabia for an institution whose primary purpose is to hold and manage partial residential ownership stakes on behalf of households and institutional investors. A bank cannot do this efficiently within existing capital adequacy frameworks. The institutional form itself is missing.

### 3. Sharia Structuring Complexity

Adapting Diminishing Musharaka to a three-party platform structure — with transparent consumer protections and pre-agreed staircasing mechanics — raises questions of scholarly consensus that have not yet been fully tested. This is not a blocker. It is a design task requiring prioritisation.

### 4. Institutional Inertia

Any platform that reallocates capital away from traditional subsidy channels will face resistance from the incumbents those channels sustain. The greatest barrier to Shared Ownership in the GCC is not financial design. Naming it directly is a prerequisite for designing around it.

> These frictions are not arguments against the model. They are the design brief.

# Section 5: The UK Precedent — What to Copy and What to Avoid

The United Kingdom scaled Shared Ownership through regulated housing providers including L&Q, Clarion Housing Group, and Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing. At its best, the model created an institutional layer capable of retaining equity, managing staircasing, governing resale protections, and recycling capital into future delivery. That governance infrastructure is what made the model investable at scale.

⚠ A 2024 Parliamentary Committee review found that rising rents, uncapped service charges, liability for repairs, and complex lease structures had made shared ownership extremely difficult for many aspiring full owners. Complaints to the Housing Ombudsman rose by nearly **400 percent** between 2020 and 2024. Of approximately 400,000 shared ownership homes ever built in the UK, only around half remain categorised as such.

| What the UK Got Right | What the GCC Must Fix from Day One |
|---|---|
| Institutional governance layer capable of holding retained equity at scale | Cap occupancy charges and service fees with transparent, pre-agreed formulas |
| Long-duration income profile attractive to patient capital | Pre-agree staircasing valuation methodology to eliminate legal ambiguity |
| Regulatory framework that provides consumer protections | Cap staircasing transaction costs to make incremental progress economically viable |
| Capital recycling mechanism into new housing delivery | Structural protections to prevent ownership inventory leaking into open market |
| Demonstrated scalability — 400,000+ homes over four decades | Build Sharia supervisory governance in from inception, not as an afterthought |

Saudi Arabia has a rare opportunity to define the architecture before these problems are embedded. The window to get the architecture right is open. It will not remain so indefinitely.

# Section 6: The Registered Ownership Platform — A Proposed Architecture

What is missing across the GCC is a formal **Registered Ownership Platform** — a regulated institutional structure capable of holding retained equity, managing staircasing relationships, protecting consumers, and recycling capital back into new housing delivery. This is not a bank. It is not a developer. It is not a government subsidy programme. It is a new category of institution — positioned between developers, homeowners, lenders, investors, and government — with a specific mandate to manage partial ownership relationships over multi-decade time horizons.

## The Deposit Gap: What the Numbers Show

**Conventional path:** Under a conventional mortgage requiring a 20 percent deposit, a household must find SAR 300,000 before a single payment is made. For a middle-income professional in Riyadh, this represents several years of concentrated savings — before transaction costs, furnishing, and financial buffers.

**ROP path:** Under a 40 percent Shared Ownership model, that entry cost falls to SAR 120,000 — a reduction of 60 percent. The SAR 180,000 reduction is not a subsidy. It is a structural reconfiguration of the capital stack — one that preserves market pricing, protects developer returns, and creates long-duration income for investors simultaneously.

## Operational Flow

A developer sells a partial stake in a completed unit to a household and transfers the retained share into the platform. The platform charges an occupancy fee on that retained share, structured as an Ijara arrangement to maintain Sharia compliance.

Over time, the household purchases additional tranches through a simplified staircasing process with pre-agreed valuation methodology and capped transaction fees — correcting two of the specific design failures that damaged the UK model.


Because the platform remains a co-owner rather than only a lender, restructuring options in the event of household financial difficulty become materially more flexible — reducing systemic risk to the housing finance system.

### ROP Acquisition ←

Developer transfers retained share to the Registered Ownership Platform.

### Staircasing Purchases ←

Household buys incremental ownership tranches over time.



### → Ijara Occupancy

Household pays Ijara occupancy charge for use of the home.

### → Capital Recycling

Proceeds are reinvested to finance new housing delivery.

Platform governance would operate through a coordinated regulatory framework involving SAMA, the Ministry of Municipalities and Housing, and an independent Sharia supervisory board — with mandatory consumer disclosure standards and transparent fee structures built in from inception.

# Section 7: The Investment Case — Long-Duration Sovereign Income

The institutional investment case for a Registered Ownership Platform is not secondary to the housing argument. It is central to it. The model only works at scale if institutional capital finds it attractive. The evidence strongly suggests it will.

**$584M**

**Dubai Residential REIT IPO raised**

January 2025, Nasdaq Dubai

**$15B**

**Order book — 25x oversubscription**

A definitive statement of institutional demand

**$4.9T**

**GCC sovereign funds AUM**

Only a fraction currently in domestic residential income vehicles

A Registered Ownership Platform creates precisely the kind of asset class this capital increasingly seeks: **long-duration, inflation-linked, Sharia-compliant, and domestically anchored**. For PIF specifically, the ROP creates an asset class that generates recurring domestic income, advances a core Vision 2030 mandate, and provides a replicable institutional template across the wider GCC — a combination of financial return, strategic alignment, and regional influence that is structurally rare in a single vehicle.

# The Portfolio-Scale Investment Thesis


The investment case is most legible at portfolio scale — which is the unit at which sovereign capital is actually deployed. Consider a **1,000-unit pilot portfolio** of SAR 1.5 million residential units within a giga-project environment. At a 60 percent retained equity share per unit, the platform holds approximately **SAR 900 million** in retained residential equity at inception.

### Base Case Income

At a **7% gross Ijara occupancy charge** — benchmarked to current Riyadh mid-market yields — the portfolio generates **SAR 63 million** in gross Ijara income annually. After a conservative 15% management cost deduction, net Ijara income is approximately **SAR 53.6 million per annum** — a net yield of **5.95%** on the retained equity base, contractually structured from day one.

### Three Structural Return Enhancers

- **Capital appreciation:** At 4% per annum, the SAR 900M retained equity base appreciates to approximately SAR 1.33 billion by Year 10 — generating unrealised capital uplift of SAR 430 million.
- **Staircasing proceeds:** Assuming one 10% tranche purchase per household in Year 5, the 1,000-unit portfolio generates approximately SAR 109 million in staircasing capital proceeds — immediately redeployable into new retained equity positions.
- **Operating leverage:** As the platform scales, management cost ratios decline materially. Each percentage point reduction on a SAR 63M income base is SAR 630,000 of incremental net yield annually.



# Illustrative Return Model: Three Scenarios

The following model illustrates the return mechanics on a single SAR 1.5 million residential unit. All figures are indicative, based on 2025 Riyadh market data.

| Fixed Assumptions (all scenarios) | Value |
|---|---|
| Property value | SAR 1,500,000 |
| Household initial share | 40% — SAR 600,000 |
| ROP retained share | 60% — SAR 900,000 |
| Management costs | 15% of gross Ijara income |
| Staircasing assumption | One 10% tranche purchased in Year 5 |
| Hold period | 10 years |

| Return Component | Conservative | Base Case | Upside |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ijara rate (gross, p.a.) | 6.0% | 7.0% | 8.0% |
| Gross Ijara income (Year 1) | SAR 54,000 | SAR 63,000 | SAR 72,000 |
| Net Ijara income (after 15% costs) | SAR 45,900 | SAR 53,550 | SAR 61,200 |
| Net Ijara yield on retained equity | 5.1% | 5.95% | 6.8% |
| Capital appreciation (p.a.) | 3.0% | 4.0% | 5.0% |
| Retained share value at Year 10 | SAR 1,209,000 | SAR 1,332,000 | SAR 1,467,000 |
| Staircasing proceeds (Year 5, 10% tranche) | SAR 104,000 | SAR 109,000 | SAR 115,000 |
| **Total blended return (10-year hold)** | **~6.5–7.5% p.a.** | **~8.5–9.5% p.a.** | **~10.5–11.5% p.a.** |

These figures are indicative illustrations only. They do not constitute a financial projection, investment recommendation, or valuation. A full financial model would require detailed property-level assumptions, platform cost structure, funding terms, and regulatory capital requirements.

Key methodology notes: Ijara rates (6–8% gross) reflect prevailing gross rental yield bands for comparable mid-market residential assets in Riyadh as of 2025 (Knight Frank, JLL). Capital appreciation (3–5% p.a.) reflects the spread of residential price growth forecasts for Riyadh 2025–2030. The 15% management cost assumption makes no allowance for operating leverage at portfolio scale and therefore understates achievable returns as the platform matures.

# Why This Is Different From Existing Vehicles

### Traditional Mortgage Lender

**Limitation:** Lender only — no equity participation, no long-term stewardship.

**ROP Advantage:** Co-owner: income + appreciation + staircasing proceeds across a multi-decade relationship.

### GCC REITs

**Limitation:** Optimised for stabilised commercial/residential — not dynamic partial ownership.

**ROP Advantage:** Dynamic equity model: income grows as ownership transfers, creating a self-reinforcing capital cycle.

### Subsidy Programmes

**Limitation:** Capital drain — government pays out, no return generated.

**ROP Advantage:** Self-sustaining — capital recycled into new delivery without perpetual government outlay.

### Outright Development Sales

**Limitation:** One-time transaction — no recurring income, no long-term relationship.

**ROP Advantage:** Multi-decade relationship — recurring income per unit, compounding platform value over time.

# Section 8: Risks and Mitigations

A credible investment proposal identifies and addresses its risks directly. The ROP model carries four principal risk categories. Each is real. Each has a defined mitigation. None is a fundamental objection to the model — they are design constraints that the pilot structure must be built to manage.

### Market Risk

**Description:** Residential property values in Riyadh could underperform assumptions — through supply surge from giga-project delivery, macro headwinds, or normalisation of post-2022 price growth.

**Mitigation:** The Ijara income stream is contractually structured and independent of capital appreciation — providing a floor return in all market conditions. The conservative scenario (3% appreciation) still delivers 6.5–7.5% blended return. The platform's co-ownership position also provides natural downside protection.

### Regulatory Risk

**Description:** The ROP requires creation of a new regulatory category within SAMA's framework. Timeline to pilot launch could extend materially if regulatory engagement is deprioritised.

**Mitigation:** SAMA's track record in creating new regulatory categories — including the SRC framework and the evolution of the REIT structure — demonstrates institutional capability to move at pace when a project carries sovereign priority. The pilot structure can also be designed within existing frameworks initially.

### Sharia Structuring Risk

**Description:** The tripartite platform structure raises specific questions of scholarly consensus that have not yet been tested at this scale.

**Mitigation:** Engaging a dedicated Sharia advisory board as a founding governance pillar — rather than as a late-stage compliance exercise — is the primary mitigation. The four specific structuring questions identified are well-defined and solvable; precedents exist in sukuk structuring at comparable scale.

### Household Default Risk

**Description:** A proportion of ROP households will experience financial difficulty that impairs their ability to maintain Ijara payments and staircase on schedule.

**Mitigation:** The ROP's co-ownership structure provides materially more restructuring flexibility than a conventional mortgage. Drawing the first cohort from REDF's existing qualified borrower base provides a natural quality filter. An explicit arrears management protocol and reserve funding mechanism should be established as part of founding governance.

The risk-adjusted return of the ROP is stronger than the headline return comparison suggests. Its structural design — co-ownership, contractual Ijara income, multi-option restructuring — provides natural mitigations that conventional mortgage or outright sales models do not.

# Section 9: Who Should Build It - and How

The institutional candidates for a Registered Ownership Platform are not hypothetical. They already exist in Saudi Arabia. The question is not whether the capability is present — it is whether the political and institutional will exists to configure it.

### National Housing Company (NHC)

Has the mandate, the supply pipeline, and the government relationship to operate as a founding platform provider. The NHC's existing role in housing delivery makes it the natural anchor institution — with direct access to the household cohort the platform is designed to serve.

### Roshn

Has the capital base and giga-project access to embed the model at scale from inception. Roshn's residential communities represent an ideal pilot environment — controlled supply, strong demand, clear land tenure, and no legacy ownership complexity.

### Saudi Real Estate Refinance Company (SRC)

Already performs the secondary market function that would support platform capitalisation. SRC's existing infrastructure could be extended to support ROP funding structures, enabling the platform to access long-term institutional funding against its retained equity book from day one.

### Real Estate Development Fund (REDF)

Manages the subsidy and financing relationships with the households the platform is designed to serve. REDF's existing borrower base is the natural demand pool for the ROP's first cohort — households that have demonstrated financial capacity but are structurally excluded from full ownership by the deposit barrier.

### Public Investment Fund (PIF)

The indispensable anchor. Without PIF's equity commitment, the platform lacks the sovereign capitalisation to launch at meaningful scale. Without PIF's institutional credibility, the regulatory engagement with SAMA lacks the weight to move at pace. PIF is not one of several institutions that could build this. It is the institution that determines whether it gets built at all.

# The Pilot: Geography, Structure, and Timeline

The natural pilot geography is a defined residential district within one of the giga-projects — NEOM, Diriyah, or The Red Sea Project — where supply is controlled, demand is strong, land tenure is clear, and the absence of legacy ownership complexity allows clean contract design from the outset.


## Pilot Structure

A regulated joint operating arrangement between NHC and Roshn, with PIF providing anchor equity capital and SAMA establishing the regulatory perimeter.

The pilot's first cohort would be drawn from REDF's existing qualified borrower base — **1,000 units** generating **SAR 900 million** in retained equity at inception, sufficient to demonstrate platform mechanics, prove the return thesis, and attract follow-on institutional capital from GCC pension and sovereign funds.

## Why Giga-Projects Are the Right Starting Point

- Controlled supply pipeline with no legacy ownership complexity
- Strong, demographically driven demand from young professionals
- Clear land tenure enabling clean contract design from inception
- PIF's direct ownership of the development environment removes coordination friction
- Visible, high-profile setting that demonstrates the model's credibility to the wider market




A scoped pilot framework — 1,000 units, SAR 900 million in retained equity, within a designated giga-project district — could be operational within **24 months**. The model does not need to be perfect before it is launched. It needs to be governed well enough to learn from.

# Conclusion: From Financing Product to National Strategy

The GCC's housing challenge is not one of aspiration or even of financial engineering. It is one of institutional design.

### The Principles Exist

Shared Ownership already exists within Diminishing Musharaka — a principle the GCC market already understands and applies.

### The Investors Are Present

Dubai Residential REIT's $15 billion order book is the clearest possible signal of institutional demand for structured residential income exposure.

### The Institutions Exist

NHC, Roshn, SRC, REDF, and PIF together constitute the founding institution set for a viable pilot — no new organisations need to be created.

### The Demand Is Structural

Over 60% of Saudi Arabia's population is under 35. The urban population is projected to reach 86% by 2030. Demographic urgency is real and growing.

Saudi Arabia is better positioned to lead this than any other GCC market. The institutional infrastructure is the most developed. The giga-project pipeline creates a unique opportunity to embed the model at inception rather than retrofit it into legacy stock.

> What is missing is the decision to build the institutional layer that turns a well-understood financing principle into a national ownership strategy. The opportunity is defined. The institutions are present. The remaining work is not conceptual — it is institutional engineering, executable within 24 months.

# The Case for PIF to Lead

Every element of this proposal converges on a single institution.

### Capital at Scale

PIF has the capital to anchor the retained equity book at scale. Without PIF's equity commitment, the platform lacks the sovereign capitalisation to launch at meaningful scale.

### Sovereign Credibility

PIF has the sovereign credibility to legitimise the regulatory framework in the eyes of SAMA and the Ministry of Housing — the institutional weight to move regulatory engagement at pace.

### Giga-Project Ecosystem

PIF has the giga-project ecosystem — through Roshn, NEOM, and Diriyah — to provide the pilot geography without relying on legacy market structures.

### Vision 2030 Mandate

PIF has the mandate to build the financial infrastructure that makes sustainable homeownership possible for the next generation of Saudi citizens.

The ROP is not a housing programme seeking PIF's participation. It is an investment platform seeking PIF's leadership — one that generates long-duration sovereign income, advances Vision 2030's ownership mandate, and creates a replicable template for GCC housing finance that no competitor market can easily replicate.

## A Proposed First Step: Four Parallel Workstreams

| Workstream | Action Required | Lead Institution |
|---|---|---|
| Regulatory Design | Establish ROP as a formal institutional category within SAMA's framework, with capital adequacy and disclosure standards | SAMA |
| Sharia Governance | Convene a dedicated Sharia advisory board to resolve tripartite structuring questions and issue a platform-level Fatwa | REDF / Sharia Scholars |
| Pilot Structure | Define product parameters, staircasing mechanics, and consumer framework for a controlled first cohort within a designated giga-project district | NHC + Roshn |
| Anchor Capitalisation | Commit anchor equity capital to retained ownership shares for the pilot portfolio, establishing the return framework for follow-on institutional capital | Public Investment Fund (PIF) |

> The opportunity is defined. The institutions are present. The question is whether PIF chooses to lead.

# Important Notices and Disclosures

## Disclaimer

This paper is an independent thought leadership publication produced by Shehryar Gilani in a personal capacity. It does not represent the views, positions, or strategies of any current or former employer, affiliated organisation, or any PIF-backed entity. Nothing in this paper constitutes investment advice, financial advice, legal advice, or a solicitation to invest. The illustrative return models presented in Section 7 are indicative only and do not constitute financial projections or valuations.

## Disclosure of Interest

The author currently serves as Feasibility Director at a PIF-backed master developer in Saudi Arabia, where he leads financial strategy, feasibility, and investment governance across a multi-billion riyal residential development programme. The author has no current commercial mandate to develop, promote, or implement a Registered Ownership Platform, and this paper does not represent a proposal on behalf of any employer. The analysis and recommendations are the author's own, formed independently of any institutional position.

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Shehryar Gilani is a strategic finance leader specialising in real estate development, governance frameworks, and large-scale investment planning across the GCC. He has spent over a decade in real estate finance across the UK and GCC, including senior roles in social housing finance, FP&A, and strategic planning. His work spans financial modelling, capital structuring, governance design, and AI-enabled planning systems for large-scale real estate programmes. His experience in both UK social housing finance and GCC sovereign-backed development gives him a rare dual-market perspective on the institutional design questions this paper addresses.

Views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not represent any institutional position.

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